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THE HONORABLE KIM MCLANE WARDLAW* 
 
 “Constitutions should consist only of general provisions,” 
Alexander Hamilton once explained.1  “The reason is, that they 
must necessarily be permanent, and that they cannot calculate for 
the possible change of things.”2  As the Framers predicted, 
“things” certainly have changed.  In 1791, when the Bill of Rights 
was ratified, much correspondence was sent by horseback, often 
taking days to reach its final destination.  I personally recall the 
days when – as an attorney in private practice – I would carefully 
draft a letter to opposing counsel, drop it in the mail, and not 
expect a response for weeks.  Today, with the advent of the 
Internet and the invention of text messaging, written 
communications are transmitted instantaneously over a truly 
worldwide network.  How do the “general provisions” of the Fourth 
Amendment apply to modes of communication sent via 
technologies that were likely beyond the wildest imagination of the 
Founders?  And how can we ensure that our answers to today’s 
legal questions provide principled guidance to future jurists called 
upon to address issues arising from tomorrow’s technological 
developments?  We, after all, are no more capable of predicting 
the course of future technological change than were the Framers. 
At the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, we often consider the 
application of the Constitution’s “general provisions” to new 
technologies.  When we do, we not only resolve the question 
before us, but we necessarily contribute to the doctrinal framework 
within which future technologies will be considered.  For instance, 
 
 * United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  
The views expressed in this introduction are my own and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of my colleagues or of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
 1 Alexander Hamilton, Third Speech at New York Ratifying Convention (June 28, 
1788), in 5 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 114, 118 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962). 
          2 Id. 
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in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc.,3 we had to decide 
whether a police department acted unconstitutionally when it 
searched personal text messages that its officers sent or received 
on two-way pagers.  As we considered the question, we observed 
that “[t]he extent to which the Fourth Amendment provides 
protection for the contents of electronic communications in the 
Internet age is an open question,” and that the “recently minted 
standard of electronic communication via e-mails, text messages, 
and other means opens a new frontier in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.”4  In exploring this “new frontier,” we were not 
without guidance, however.  We began our constitutional analysis 
by citing the text of the Fourth Amendment, and we proceeded to 
apply the lessons of existing precedent to this relatively new form 
of communication.5  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
address this issue – not because there exists an inter-circuit split, 
as this question has been decided only by the Ninth Circuit – but 
most likely because of the importance of defining reasonable 
expectations of privacy in the information age.  (The Quon opinion 
also was the first in the nation to decide whether a wireless 
service was an “electronic communication service” under the 
Stored Communications Act, an issue that the Supreme Court did 
not take up for decision.). 
The past year has provided us many more opportunities to 
explore these new frontiers.  In United States v. Payton,6 – the 
subject of an article in this edition of the Golden Gate University 
Law Review – and United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 
Inc.,7 we examined the constitutionality of searches of information 
electronically stored on personal and proprietary computers.  In 
each case, we revisited first principles established in the 
Constitution, examined case law interpreting the constitutional 
provisions at issue, and applied that body of doctrine to new facts. 
Similarly, in Bryan v. McPherson,8 – the subject of another 
article in this edition – we considered the constitutional 
implications of a police officer’s use of the Taser X26, a stun gun 
that uses compressed nitrogen to propel electrically charged 
aluminum darts toward its target.  To nobody’s surprise, the 
 
3 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 4 Id. at 904. 
 5 Id. at 904–05. 
 6 United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 7 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (2009) (en 
banc). 
 8 Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 767 (9th Cir 2009). 
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Constitution lacks explicit instructions on the circumstances under 
which this state-of-the-art law enforcement tool lawfully may be 
deployed.  But it does provide us with guiding principles, the 
foundation upon which case law has developed.  Thus, in Bryan, 
we returned to the analytical framework of Graham v. Connor,9 
and its progeny, which instructed us to consider the government’s 
interest in the use of the Taser, which, in turn, depended on the 
severity of the crime at issue, the immediacy of any threat 
imposed by the suspect, and the suspect’s resistance to arrest.  
The invention of the Taser was not license for the courts to 
remake the law – a task exclusively within the province of the 
people and their elected representatives – but was instead a 
reason to apply existing law to new law enforcement technology. 
Technological innovations often present our court with 
interesting issues of local governance as well.  Last year, in Sprint 
v. Palos Verdes,10 we were called upon to examine the extent of 
municipalities’ authority to regulate the placement and aesthetics 
of cellular telephone towers in light of a federal statute enacted to 
facilitate the development of wireless services.  In analyzing the 
federal, state, and local laws governing the issue, we took note of 
the longstanding “tension between technological advancement 
and community aesthetics.”11  Similarly, today, we are currently 
considering the extent to which a city may regulate state-of-the-art 
billboards, including “supergraphic signs” and displays featuring 
digital content.12 
There is no doubt that, given its large population, geographic 
reach, and the diverse, creative and innovative people and 
industries within its jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
will continue to be among the first in the nation to address legal 
questions involving novel technologies.  However, technological 
change does not come to the Ninth Circuit exclusively in the form 
of legal issues which we are called upon to resolve.  I am proud to 
say that our court has embraced new technologies to improve the 
administration of justice in a myriad of ways.  Litigants are now 
able to file documents electronically, saving time and resources.  
Web-based streaming media permit members of the public to 
observe oral arguments even when they are unable to attend 
 
 9 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 10 Sprint v. Palos Verdes, 583 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 11 Id. at 720. 
 12 See World Wide Rush v. City of Los Angeles, No. 08-56454 (argued and 
submitted December 10, 2009). 
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proceedings in person.  This is especially useful as our en banc 
proceedings, held typically in San Francisco or Pasadena, are 
streamed to public conference areas in each of our courthouses.  
Beginning the day after an oral argument is heard, a digitized 
audio recording is made available on our court’s public web site.  
We have also begun to allow the media to use electronic devices 
for blogging, tweeting, and other realtime reporting from the 
courtroom.  Our court library compiles and distributes a daily 
digest of media coverage and blog entries summarizing public 
discussions of our work.  Overall, innovations in the employment 
of technology instituted under the strong leadership of Chief Judge 
Kozinski have ensured greater transparency and efficiency of our 
judicial proceedings.  Behind the scenes, email and word 
processing systems – tools that, not long ago, were unavailable to 
judges – have facilitated dialogue and debate among members of 
our court.  Most of our judges have themselves become 
technologically savvy and can be seen with an array of court-
issued laptops, mobile devices, cellular telephones, and other 
means of staying in contact 24/7 as we “ride circuit.” 
In a world of constantly changing technologies, it is important 
that we periodically take time to stop and reflect on the product of 
our vast and evolving dockets.  I am grateful to the Golden Gate 
University Law Review for its annual examination of some of our 
most important decisions from each preceding year, which sit at 
the intersection of law and technology and elsewhere.  I look 
forward to reading the 2010 edition and hope others will take the 
opportunity to learn about our court’s most recent decisions. 
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